The Unification of Germany

When it comes to the unification of major European states that were or were perceived by some as ‘nation-states’ one will most likely think of the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy and Germany. Some had an easier time achieving unification than others. In the United Kingdom, it was not especially difficult but achieving it occurred over a fairly long period of time. Wales was subdued by England, Ireland became a vassal of England (conquering the whole island took quite a while) and then there was Scotland. Ultimately, England and Scotland came together as a result of the English queen passing to her reward with no children of her own and England and Scotland came into personal union under King James I. Much later still, under Queen Anne, all three kingdoms became united under one government, though still not without some political and economic pressure being brought to bear. All of this came about over quite a stretch of centuries. The unification of Spain was, in a way, the most “natural” of them all, being finally achieved by the marriage of the King of Aragon and the Queen of Castile. Italy probably had the most difficult unification of all since large parts of the country were held by two originally non-Italian royal families, there was the Pope right in the middle of it all and those pushing for unification were divided between republicans and royalists. Then there was Germany.

Although not without a degree of ‘storm and stress’ the unification of Germany was surprisingly easy. There are many reasons why it could have been much, much more difficult. Like Italy there were powerful foreign countries which opposed German unification and there were differences in language (or at least dialect) from one region to another. Yet, unlike Italy, the area that became Germany was much more politically divided with three Free Cities, seven Principalities, five Duchies, six Grand Duchies and four Kingdoms. Nor was there religious unity. The large majority were Protestants (mostly Lutheran) but there was a sizeable minority of Catholics and a smaller Jewish minority as well. Germany also did not have any ancient history of unity to look back on for inspiration. Spain had the Visigoth Kingdom of Spain that existed prior to the Muslim conquest and Italy had Imperial Rome but the area that became Germany had never been firmly under one government at any point in history. The closest was the Holy Roman Empire but for the vast majority of time that it existed, actual central control was only temporary and for the most part the constituent states ruled themselves and bargained with the Emperor rather than submitting to his authority unconditionally. Besides which, though the legacy of the Holy Roman Empire would at times be claimed, the memory of the “First Reich” was a rather problematic one.

From the earliest days of the first steps toward unification a rivalry could be seen between the Austrian Empire (whose first Kaiser was the last Holy Roman Emperor) and the rising power of the Kingdom of Prussia. In 1815, at the Congress of Vienna, it was Emperor Francis I of Austria who became the first President of the German Confederation undoubtedly because of his prestige as the last Holy Roman Emperor. Then, it was Prussia that pushed the customs union that united the German-speaking states economically in 1818. This was also when the black-red-gold flag first appeared as the colors of the German Confederation. Many mistakenly believe the flag only appeared during the revolutions of 1848. Austria, however, was at a bit of a disadvantage because of her own past success. The Napoleonic Wars helped give rise to nationalist movements in both Italy and Germany. The Germans, after being defeated and dominated by the French, shared a common enemy and were united in their common misfortune. Austria, however, was always seen as something somewhat different since the Hapsburg dominion included so many non-German peoples. The Austrian Empire was a major enough force that not as many felt the need to band together as people in the smaller German states did.

Tensions between Austria and Prussia long predated the movement for national unification and, from the very beginning, it was usually Austria that lost and Prussia that gained. In the days of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, the unity was more symbolic than factual and especially toward the end, no one even pretended that the Emperor in Vienna actually ruled the Empire beyond the borders of Austria and Hungary. The Prussians had first challenged imperial authority simply by claiming royal status. First the local monarch became “King IN Prussia” and in a later concession “King OF Prussia” and at times Prussians and Austrians went to war such as during the conflict between Emperor Joseph II and King Frederick the Great of Prussia. The French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars gave them someone else to fight but the old tensions remained. Also as a result of Napoleon (whether by agreements with him or conflicts against him) each made gains but Prussia gained amongst the German people whereas Austrian gains were mostly amongst non-German peoples, mostly Italians and also some Slavs by gaining Tarnopol from Russia. This, combined with the already sizeable Magyar and Slavic populations within the Austrian Empire further served to set Austria apart from the rest of the German-speaking world. However, Hapsburg preeminence remained due to the size of the Austrian Empire and the historic legacy of the House of Hapsburg.

Early on, the movement for German unification (as in other countries) was largely led by liberals, the young, the professorial class and more radical republican revolutionaries. This was seen most dramatically in the revolutions of 1848 when liberal German nationalists rose up, under the black-red-gold flag, demanding a parliament, a constitution, universal male suffrage and the unification of all Germans under the leadership of the King of Prussia. The result was the short-lived Frankfurt Assembly of 1848-49 and the St Paul’s Church constitution which offered the German crown to King Friedrich Wilhelm IV of Prussia. However, the nationalists were far from being in control of the whole of the German-speaking states and the King of Prussia, who was somewhat more liberal than his predecessor and who had shown some favor to the goal of unification, refused to accept leadership of the movement, famously saying that he would not accept, “a crown from the gutter”. One sticking point was the reluctance of the King of Prussia to accept a state which would cut off the other German monarchs whose support the King wanted to have under a constitution that would restrict royal authority. He did, however, go along with some tentative steps toward unity of the German states outside of Austria but later abandoned the idea when Austrian opposition proved resolute. In the end, the 1848 revolutions were suppressed, the German princes reasserted control and the liberal nationalist drive for unification was put to rest but only for the time being.

Things began to change in a big way after the accession of King Wilhelm I of Prussia and the rise of Otto von Bismarck to political supremacy in Berlin. More conservative Prussians were coming around to the idea of German unification, provided it was under Prussian leadership. Considering that Prussia had a strong economy and, arguably, man-for-man the strongest army in Europe, that might not have seemed too tall an order. However, there were obstacles. One was the King himself. Wilhelm I was quite content being the King of Prussia who owed his throne to God and had no interest in becoming an Emperor of Germany who would owe his throne to a political agreement or elected assembly. Another problem was the Austrians who emperors continued to serve as presidents of the German Confederation and who had the benefit of legitimacy when it came to pan-German leadership from their history as Holy Roman Emperors. Austria would be sure to resist any effort to unite Germany under Prussian leadership (just as Prussia would likely have resisted any similar effort under Austrian leadership). Another problem was the south German states which were more Catholic, closer to Austria and whose royal families owed their “royal” status to Napoleonic France and thus could be problematic for Prussia. There was also the “problem” of the House of Hohenzollern itself and how unification would be achieved and what sort of a united Germany it would be.

King Wilhelm I, a traditional, old-fashioned sort of monarch (God bless him) was certainly not keen on the idea of German unification. Bismarck was adamantly pushing for Prussia to take charge of the movement, but King Wilhelm I did not really want to be an Emperor. After all, the Austrian Emperor was “the” Emperor and Wilhelm I did not want to appear as a sort of ambitious usurper of the rank and title that had traditionally belonged to the House of Hapsburg and which was bound up in the memory of the very Catholic Holy Roman Empire. Crown Prince Friedrich, however, was another story. He greatly favored unification and was eager to be Emperor of Germany. However, while Bismarck shared this ambition, the sort of united Germany the Crown Prince wanted was definitely not the sort that Bismarck wanted. Crown Prince Friedrich and his wife the Princess Royal Victoria of Great Britain, were rather liberal compared to the Chancellor and wanted to reign over a united Germany that was a democratic, limited, constitutional monarchy similar to what existed in Victorian Britain. Bismarck thought this would be a disaster and set the German princes against Prussia and lead to nothing but trouble. However, Bismarck pushed ahead with his plan, supported at times by the Crown Prince even as he urged the King to keep his son with his liberal ideas on a short leash.

It is usual to see the final years before German unification as being totally masterminded by Bismarck. This is not entirely true. Certainly, Bismarck had a gift at turning events to his advantage, and so that of Prussia, but he was often reacting to events that he had nothing to do with instigating. For example, for Prussia to dominate the process of unification, it was clear that the two countries which stood to lose would be Austria officially by that time) and France. Prussia, despite a strong army that had recently been modernized and improved yet again thanks to the brilliant minds of Graf von Molte and Graf von Roon, would stand little chance of victory against France and Austria together. It was simply good fortune for Bismarck that France and Austria each took steps to isolate themselves. To the horror of Prince Metternich, Austria allowed herself to be provoked into making the first aggressive move in a war against France in Italy. Later, when Austria could have used help in dealing with Prussia, France would remain neutral just as Austria would remain neutral when the French had their turn at a war against Prussia (in that case, one in which it was France that allowed herself to be provoked into making the first aggressive move). Bismarck engineered none of this but took full advantage of such events which allowed Prussia to take on only one major enemy at a time.

Prussia proved how modern and efficient her military forces were in a war against Denmark alongside the other members of the German Confederation, including Austria, in 1864. This area would provide the excuse for Prussia finally going to war with Austria only a few years later in 1866. It seems more likely that Bismarck was at least largely responsible for orchestrating this, possibly after being less than impressed with the capability of the Austrian army when compared to that of Prussia. By this time, the great Austrian commanders of 1848 were gone and the penny-pinching government in Vienna had failed to keep the Austrian military modernized and up-to-date whereas the Prussian forces were positively state-of-the-art. Once again, events conspired to keep Austria largely isolated in this conflict. Although most of the south German states allied with Austria, other than Saxony they proved to be of little consequence and no outside help came for a number of reasons. France still bore ill-will against Austria and, in any event, did not expect Austria to have any trouble defeating the Prussians. Italy allied with Prussia over continued Austrian rule of Venice and Russia, previously helpful to Austria, remained neutral due to resentment over Austrian neutrality during the Crimean War (something Russia was especially touchy about considering that they had come to the rescue of Austria during the Hungarian rebellion in 1848).

The final course of German unification was therefore decided by a seven week conflict which determined that Prussia would dominate the German nationalist movement and Austria would be excluded. Prussian advances in weaponry and logistics made short work of the Austrians and soon Austria sued for peace. Prussia was not overly demanding in reaching a settlement, anxious to avoid having an embittered Austria as a future enemy. There was also little Austria had that Prussia wanted, they simply wanted Austria out of the way in the drive for German unification under Prussian leadership. Austria was excluded from German affairs and the old German Confederation was officially abolished, replaced by the short-lived North German Confederation which was simply a stepping stone to the united Germany. France helped negotiate the peace and one cannot help but wonder if Emperor Napoleon III realized that he was next on the Prussian menu. He was confident that his forces could defeat Prussia alone but he hoped Austria could keep the south German states from joining in. Again, however, events far beyond the control of Prussia worked together to isolate France.

Bismarck, naturally, did his best to encourage this by playing up French interest in certain south German territories but for the most part it was French policy which ensured they would remain friendless in the next war. An alliance was proposed consisting of France, Italy and Austria to contain Prussian expansion and, on the surface, it seemed easy enough to accomplish. The Austrians were eager take back pride of place from Prussia and Emperor Francis Joseph agreed to the demands of the Hungarians, thus creating the Dual-Empire of Austria-Hungary in the hope that this would quiet unrest and allow him to concentrate on the Prussian enemy. As tensions increased between France and Prussia, Napoleon III certainly seemed open to the alliance but it fell apart over the situation in Italy. King Victor Emmanuel II expressed support for the alliance (eager to nullify the threat of Austria) but the public remained adamantly opposed so long as French troops remained on Italian soil, referring to the garrison Napoleon III kept in Rome to maintain Papal rule over the city. So long as the French remained in Rome, Italy would not ally with France and if Italy would not ally with France, Austria would not risk taking her eye off of them and so would not ally with France either. Napoleon was stuck. He had gained little from garrisoning Rome but he did not want to risk Catholic anger by withdrawing his soldiers without the consent of the Pope and the Pope was not about to consent to such a thing as the presence of French bayonets were the only thing maintaining his authority over the Eternal City. The Austria-Hungary settlement also did not work out quite as planned for Emperor Francis Joseph as the Prime Minister of Hungary opposed any intervention with France against Prussia.

The southern German states had also, over the course of the wars with Denmark and Austria, come to see Prussia as the rising star in Europe. If they had to be the friend or enemy of Prussia, they would prefer to be friends. There were also worries that they could lose a great deal in any peace settlement between Napoleon and Bismarck if they held aloof. So, despite the hopes of Napoleon, when war came in 1870 the southern states joined with Prussia in invading France. This, of course, was after the doctoring of the famous Ems Telegram by which Bismarck tweaked the Napoleonic nose, provoking France into making the first aggressive move. The war was a triumph for Prussia and the other German states and a stunning defeat for France, ending with the collapse of the Second French Empire, riots, revolution and widespread suffering. However, Prussia achieved the goal of establishing the united Germany in the way the conservative faction wanted (and, happily, France rebounded rather quickly anyway).

At the famous Hall of Mirrors in Versailles, King Wilhelm I of Prussia was proclaimed the first “German Emperor”. This was significant. He was not “Emperor of Germany” (though many mistakenly use the term) but rather “German Emperor” which was a distinction to calm the fears of the other German monarchs that their rights might be violated. In some cases it took some effort but the German princes who had mostly opposed unification in the past, under Prussian leadership decided to get out in front of the nationalist movement rather than fighting against it. Despite his reluctance, Wilhelm I was persuaded to accept the crown of Kaiser because it came about in a way that was far removed from what had been offered to his elder brother or even what his son would have favored. German unity was not achieved by a popular vote or government legislation. It was achieved by the German princes coming together and agreeing to unification on their own terms with the imperial crown going to Prussia which had led the way. No one lost their throne over it (other than Napoleon III and that was ultimately due to his own people) and the united Germany was one of united monarchies as well as united people. Not every non-Prussian monarch was always happy with what came after but the structure established that was known as the German Empire endured until the disaster that was the First World War and no doubt would have continued had not that conflict intervened.

The deeper question though, is whether or not this was the best way for German unity to be achieved or should it have been achieved at all? The second question is taken for granted. The united Germany achieved a great level of success it had never known before. As to the first, the way Germany was united was certainly preferable to the sort of unity which had been earlier sought by the Frankfurt Assembly, based on the consent of the German monarchs rather than abstract, liberal ideals and passing trends. Perhaps a more difficult question is whether Prussian leadership was preferable to Austrian in this movement toward unification? We cannot, of course, ever know the answer for certain. I am, admittedly, partial to the House of Hapsburg but I do not think I am being unreasonable to say that history might have unfolded for the better if German unity had been achieved based on the historical legacy of the House of Hapsburg rather than the military might of the unquestionably superb Prussian army. True, one could point to later examples of Austrian adventures as a source of trouble, but all of these came about after Austria had been excluded from German affairs and was forced to focus on the problematic Balkans to find a new place in the world for herself. It is a debatable point and we cannot know the answer. Hapsburg leadership seems to have been the better option to me, but that’s just one monarchists’ opinion.